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Denial of Unemployment Benefits to Otherwise Eligible
Women on the Basis of Pregnancy: Section 3304(a)(12) of
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
Twenty-one million women I in the United States between the
ages of eighteen and thirty-four are in ·the civilian labor force. 2 Approximately eighty-five percent of women in this age range3 are
likely to give birth to at least one child during their working lives.4
The availability of unemployment compensation for women who
wish to return to work after leaving their most recent employment
because of pregnancy is therefore a critical issue. Unemployment
compensation may constitute a substantial portion of the financial
resources of these women. 5
Although unemployment compensation is generally a matter of
state law, the federal government has assumed a supervisory role. 6
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act7 (FUTA) established guidelines for the administration of state plans. A state must comply with
these federal standards to be eligible for federal assistance. 8 In 1976,
Congress amended section 3304(a)(l2) of FUTA, prohibiting disbursement of federal funds to states that deny unemployment compensation "solely on the basis of pregnancy." 9
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 363, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES: 1980, at 33
(1981) [hereinafter cited as CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE].
2. The term "civilian labor force" refers to all nonmilitary persons classified as employed
or unemployed. Excluded are persons neither employed nor seeking work outside their own
home, retired persons, students, seasonal workers for whom the survey fell in an off season,
those with long-term disabilities and the voluntarily idle. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME, SERIES P-60,
No. 132, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
1980, at 225 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME].
3. This age range was selected as representative of the peak childbearing years. Most of
the data reported in a 1977 Census Bureau fertility survey relate to this age group. See U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 325, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE 1977 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
CENSUS BUREAU, FERTILITY SURVEY].
4. This calculation is based on data collected in CENSUS BUREAU, FERTILITY SURVEY,
supra note 3, at 22. See also
KAMERMAN, MATERNITY AND PARENTAL BENEFITS AND
LEAVES 8 (Impact on Policy Series Monograph No. I, 1980) (summary of relevant statistics).
5. See Porcher v. Brown, 459 U.S. I 150, 1153 (1983) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
6. See notes 34-45 infra and accompanying text for a description of federal and state cooperation in the field of unemployment compensation.
7. 26
§§ 3301-3311 (1982).
8. See notes 29-33 infra and accompanying text.
9. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982). For the text of this section, see text at note 46 infra.

s.

u.s.c.

1925,

1926

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 82:1925

Several states and the District of Columbia 10 currently deny benefits to claimants who left their last position for health reasons unrelated to employment. 11 In these states women who are otherwise
entitled to unemployment compensation under state law are subject
to probable disqualification if they terminate their employment as a
10. The Solicitor General, in his brief as amicus curiae in Porcher v. Brown, noted that
eight states and the District of Columbia denied benefits to claimants who left work because of
health problems unrelated to their employment: Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, West Virginia and, to a lesser extent, Vermont. Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 18, Porcher v. Brown, 459 U.S. l 150 (1983) (denial of
certiorari) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curiae Brief]. Since the brief was filed, however, New
Mexico has amended its statute to prohibit the denial of benefits solely on the basis of preg•
nancy. N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 51-I-7(A) (1983 Rep. Vol.). Thus, although New Mexico still dis•
qualifies claimants who leave work for causes unrelated to employment, pregnancy is exempt
from this disqualification.
I I. In two of these jurisdictions, the District of Columbia and Louisiana, decisions explic•
illy upholding disqualification of women who left their last employment as a result of preg•
nancy are in effect. Brooks v. District of Columbia Dept. of Employment Servs., 453 A.2d 812
(App. D.C. 1982) (per curiam); Algiers Homestead Assn. v. Brown, 246 La. 738, 167 So. 2d 349
(1964). The Brooks case involved a pregnant security guard who separated from her job because the heavy belt holding her revolver and other items that she was required to wear
pressed against her stomach, making her ill. In refusing to set aside the claimant's disqualification, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated: "Nothing in the record suggests that
her resignation was other than voluntary, and it cannot be argued that pregnancy is a work•
related illness." 453 A.2d at 813. In Louisiana, a person leaving "his employment ..• without good cause connected with his employment" is disqualified from unemployment benefits,
LA. R.Ev. STAT. ANN.§ 23:1601(1) (West 1964 & Supp. 1984). In Algiers Homestead, a woman
who left work because of illness due to pregnancy was denied benefits because this cause was
unconnected with her employment. 246 La. at 744, 167 So. 2d at 351. See also Martin Mills v.
Department of Employment Sec., 391 So. 2d 56 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (woman on maternity
leave disqualified for duration of leave because pregnancy not connected with employment).
In the other five jurisdictions, no cases involving pregnancy disqualification have been reported, although some may have arisen at the commission level. However, judicial decisions
or statutory provisions relating to the denial of benefits on the basis of other medical conditions suggest that a woman who leaves her work because of a pregnancy-related condition
would be denied benefits if she were not reinstated when she sought to return to work.
The Missouri Court of Appeals has held that an employee's illness is not to be considered
grounds for involuntary termination unless the illness was caused or aggravated by the employer. Duffy v. Labor & Indus. Relations Commn., 556 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
Leaving work because of pregnancy is regarded as voluntary. Davis v. Labor & Indus. Relations Commn., 554 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). In Nebraska, the standard is that a
termination must be involuntary and for good cause attributable to the employer. Thus, benefits have been awarded to an employee who left work because factors directly connected with
his employment caused his illness. Glionna v. Chizek, 204 Neb. 37, 40, 281 N,W.2d 220, 223
(1973).
Oklahoma, by statute, sanctions disqualification for voluntarily leaving employment without good cause connected with employment. OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 2-404 (1981). The succeeding section makes an allowance for illness in cases where job conditions so change that the
job becomes detrimental to the employee's health. OKLA. STAT, tit. 40, § 2-405 (1981). Presumably, pregnancy would not fit within the exception provided in§ 2-405. Similarly, Vermont and West Virginia provide for statutory disqualification of an employee who leaves his
last employment voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer. VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1344(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE§ 21A-6-3(1) (1978). Until 1982, persons in
West Virginia who left their last employment for health-related reasons were disqualified from
receipt of benefits under the authority of State v. Hix, 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S.E.2d 198 (1949). In
1982, the West Virginia Court of Appeals overruled Hix in relevant part in Gibson v. Rutledge, 298 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1982). It is not clear whether the Gibson decision will encompass denial of benefits on the basis of pregnancy.
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result of pregnancy. In effect, these states interpret section
3304(a)(12) to require only that pregnancy not be treated differently
from any medical condition not connected with employment. 12 The
Department of Labor, the agency charged with evaluating state
plans, 13 endorses this interpretation of the statute. 14
In a recent Fourth Circuit case, Brown v. Porcher, 15 two formerly
pregnant women challenged this reading of section 3304(a)(l2). The
court held that South Carolina's policy of denying benefits to women
who left their last employment because of pregnancy violated the
mandate of section 3304(a)(12), regardless of the state's treatment of
claimants who separated from work because of other medical conditions.16 The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in the Porcher
case, with three justices dissenting. 17 The Court's disposition of the
petition allows discordant interpretations of section 3304(a)(12) to
stand. 18
This Note examines the conflicting interpretations of section
3304(a)(12) of the Federal Act. The Porcher decision serves as a
point of reference throughout this Note, since opposing constructions
of the section were presented in the case. Part I describes the basic
framework of FUTA and presents the disparate interpretations of
section 3304(a)(12) that have been advanced.
Part II analyzes section 3304(a)(12) with reference to the statutory language and legislative history. As a preliminary matter, this
part considers the degree of deference that should be afforded the
12. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 10, at 8.
13. Each year on October 31 the Secretary of Labor must certify to the Secretary of the
Treasury each state whose law has been previously approved that continues to comply with
FUTA. States that are found to be in violation of FUTA are given an opportunity for a
hearing. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(c) (1982).
14. See ]!.Ole 54 infra and accompanying text.
15. Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. 946 (D.S.C. 1980), mod!fted and remanded, 660 F.2d
1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983).
16. 660 F.2d at 1004. See also notes 47-63 infra and accompanying text (description of the
Porcher opinion); 20 J. FAM. L. 572 (1981-82) (brief overview of Porcher decision).
17. 459 U.S. 1150 (1983). Justice White, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, dissented. For a discussion of Justice White's dissent, see note 63 infra and accompanying text.
18. As a result, administrators of state plans cannot be sure exactly what standard the
Federal Act imposes. See 459 U.S. at 1152 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
In addition, working women who are pregnant, or who may become pregnant in the future,
have an identifiable interest in a reliable guideline. The Porcher decision applies only to South
Carolina's law. The Secretary of Labor can continue to certify other state plans that deny
benefits to women who left work because of pregnancy on the same basis that benefits are
denied to persons who leave their job for any other medical condition unrelated to their employment.
Although no estimate is available of the amount of the total additional benefit that states
would have to pay if they were required to include in their plans eligible women who leave
work because of pregnancy, considerable resources are undoubtedly at issue. The United
States, in its amicus curiae brief in Porcher, reported that South Carolina was paying an additional $1.5 million in benefits and estimated that West Virginia, which is also in the Fourth
Circuit, would be liable for about the same amount. Amicus Curia Brief, supra note 10, at 18.
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Secretary of Labor's certification of state programs that treat pregnancy like all other medical conditions for purposes of denial of benefits. This Note argues that the Secretary's determination that these
plans satisfy the requirement of FUTA is not dispositive because:
(1) the statutory language does not vest absolute discretion in the
Secretary of Labor and (2) courts are not required to endorse administrative readings that conflict with the enabling statute or the policy
behind it. On the basis of the statutory language and the available
legislative history, this Note concludes that Congress, in enacting
section 3304(a)(l2), intended that a pregnant woman's necessary separation from work, as determined by the woman and her physician,
should not be the basis for denial of benefits if the woman seeks to
return to work after childbirth but is not reemployed.
Part III discusses policy considerations relevant to analysis of
section 3304(a)(12). Because pregnancy uniquely affects women,
statutes that deny benefits because of pregnancy may discriminate on
the basis of sex. In addition, Congress and the courts have recognized both the important economic contributions of women in the
work force and the fundamental personal and societal interests related to procreation. States that deny unemployment benefits to women on the basis of pregnancy force women to choose between
employment and childbirth, thus frustrating these policies.
This Note further contends that treating pregnancy in the same
manner as other medical conditions glosses over the fact that virtually all pregnant women must at some point leave their employment
to attend to childbirth. Allowing the states to group pregnancy with
other medical conditions effectively permits the states indirectly to
deny benefits on the basis of pregnancy when they clearly could not
do so directly, in disregard of the fact that Congress specifically addressed the issue of pregnancy-related disqualifications in section
3304(a)(l2). 19
I.

SECTION 3304(a)(l2) IN CONTEXT AND THE CURRENT
CONTROVERSY OVER ITS INTERPRETATION

A. Federal Involvement in Unemployment Compensation

Unemployment compensation in the United States is a cooperative federal-state venture. 20 Distribution to individual claimants is
generally a matter of state law. All states require a claimant to sat19. This Note recognizes that the language and history of § 3304(a)(l2) do not require
payment of benefits to all pregnant claimants. For example, women who make themselves
unavailable for work while still able to work or who elect to remain home after childbirth are
ineligible. Rather, the provision was added to prohibit states from denying compensation to
otherwise eligible women on the ground that they left their last employment as a result of
pregnancy.
20. See note 35 iefra.
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isfy some form of a three-tier test. 21 First, the claimant must meet
the state's qualifying requirements before filing for benefits. This involves working for a statutorily defined period or earning a specified
amount of wages. 22 Second, the unemployed worker must be eligible to receive benefits. To be eligible an individual must be both
able to work and available for work. 23 Third, the worker must not
be subject to any disqualification prescribed by the statute.24 The
most common reasons for disqualification25 include voluntarily leaving the job without good cause,26 discharge for misconduct27 and refusal of suitable work. 28 The federal government performs a
supervisory function through a system of tax incentives.29 FUTA
provides for grants to state governments30 and tax credits to employers31 in states certified by the Secretary of Labor as having complied
21. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 10, at 3; see also W. HABER & M. MURRAY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 113-19 (1966) (describing general requirements for unemployment compensation).
22. This requirement is designed to measure the claimant's attachment to the labor market.
W. HABER & M. MURRAY, supra note 21, at 113. The idea is to insure some link between the
source of unemployment funds and their expenditure. Without some type of qualifying requirement, compensation pools might be depleted by persons who work intermittently at the
expense of the regularly employed. See R. ALTMAN, AVAILABILITY FOR WORK 75 (1950).
23. SeeR. ALTMAN, supra note 22, at 84; W. HABER & M. MURRAY, supra note 21, at 26465.
24. A principal function of unemployment compensation is to assist individuals who are
involuntarily unemployed. See Economic Security Act: Hearings on S. 1130 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 14th Cong., 1st Sess. 1328 (1935). Disqualifications are imposed to eliminate claimants whose unemployment results from their own actions. W. HABER & M. MURRAY, supra note 21, at 114.
25. NATIONAL COMMN. ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: FINAL REPORT46 (1980). Seea/soR. ALTMAN, supra note 22, at 81; W. HABER & M.
MURRAY, supra note 21, at 114.
26. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-775(1) (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1106{a)
(Repl. 1976 & Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 19, § 3315(1)(Repl. 1979 & Supp. 1982);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(a) (West 1962 & Supp. 1984).
27. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 25-4-78(3) (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 46-lll{b) (1981); LA.
RE.v. STAT. ANN.§ 23:1601(2) (West 1964 & Supp. 1984); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A,
§ 25(e) (West 1976 & Supp. 1984).
28. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 23.20.379(b) (1981); FLA. STAT.§ 443.101(2) (1983); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 42l.29(l)(e) (1979).
29. FUTA levies an excise tax on employers in an amount equal to a percentage of wages
paid. 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (1982). The term "wages" includes the cash value of all remuneration
for employment, subject to several listed exclusions. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(b) (1982). Employers
are then allowed a credit of up to 90% of the federal tax for contributions to state plans that
have been approved by the Secretary of Labor. 26 U.S.C. § 3302 (1982). For a brief description of the mechanics of FUTA, see California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 397
(1982); Saint Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 775 n.3
(1981); Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. at 947.
30. 26 u.s.c. § 3304 (1982).
The Social Security Act authorizes release of federal funds to state governments found to
be in compliance with federal standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504, 1101-1108 (1982). These
grants are to be used to defray the costs of administering the state's compensation program. 42
U.S.C. § llOl(c)(l)(B) (1982).
31. 26 U.S.C. § 3302 (1982). An employer is defined as anyone who, during the calendar
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with the fundamental federal standards enumerated in section
3304(a).32 Unemployment compensation is thus grounded in federal
law, but its execution is a function of state law.33
The original Federal Act34 was adopted in 1935, in the wake of
the Great Depression. 35 The objective was to encourage the states to
establish unemployment compensation plans.36 Despite a variety of
year, paid at least $1,500 in wages or employed at least one person for any portion of20 days
in 20 different weeks. Wages paid for domestic services are excluded. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(l)
(1982).
32. See note 13 supra. Section 3304(a) presently lists 17 requirements for approval of a
state plan. These requirements have been termed fundamental federal standards because Congress has stated that federal aid is available only to those states which meet these basic prereq•
uisites. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 594 (1937); see also New York Tel. Co.
v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519,539 (1979) (quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S.
at 594); California Dept. of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971). Some of the
§ 3304(a) requirements concern administration of state programs. For example, § 3304(a)(l)
requires that all compensation be paid through public employment agencies or other agencies
that have beeµ. approved by the Secretary of Labor. Others focus on actions that must be
taken by the claimant. For example, § 3304(a)(7) states that "an individual who has received
compensation during his benefit year is required to have had work since the beginning of such
year in order to qualify for compensation in his next benefit year."
·
Two subsections regulate payment of benefits to certain classes of employees. See 26
U.S.C. § 3304(a)(l3) (1982) (athletes); 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(l4) (1982) (aliens). Two additional
subsections prohibit denial of benefits under given circumstances. Section 3304(a)(5) prohibits
denial of benefits to an otherwise eligible claimant who refuses to accept new work because of
any of the following conditions: (I) the position is available as a result ofa labor dispute (e.g.,
strike); (2) the wages or work conditions are not as favorable as the prevailing conditions for
similar work; or (3) acceptance of the work would require the claimant to join a company
union or to resign from or refrain from joining a labor organization. Section 3304(a)(l2) states
that "no person shall be denied compensation under such State law solely on the basis of
pregnancy or termination of pregnancy."
All 50 states and the District of Columbia are at present certified by the Secretary of Labor.
See Saint Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772,775 n.3 (1981);
Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 236 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1982).
33. NATIONAL COMMN. ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, supra note 25, at 14.
34. The original unemployment insurance provisions were enacted under Title IX of the
Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 74-271 §§ 301-303, 49 Stat. 620, 626-27 (1935).
The same provisions were assimilated into the 1939 Internal Revenue Code as the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, ch. 23, §§ 3301-3308, 68A Stat. 439-54 (1954). See generally lB
UNEMPL. INs. REP. (CCH) t 1020 (Sept. 29, 1980) (description offederal unemployment legislation). The Federal Act is currently part of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 33013311 (1982).
35. The federal government became involved in unemployment compensation in response
to widespread unemployment in the aftermath of the Great Depression. A few states, e.g.,
Wisconsin and New Hamsphire, attempted to meet the needs of the unemployed by imposing
a tax on employers. Most states, however, feared that such a tax would drive industry to other
states with more favorable tax laws. See generally 15 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 381, 382-84 (1981)
(concise summary of the history of the Federal Act as well as a comprehensive list of related
sources). See also Saint Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772,
775 (1981); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 587-88 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 615]; S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 12, 13 (1935) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 628]. The plan of federal-state cooperation was thus aimed at stimulating creation of state compensation plans, within the constraints
offederalism. See Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 306, 310 (1942); Buckstaff
Bath House Co. v. McKinley, 308 U.S. 358, 363 (1939); New Hampshire Dept. of Employment
Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 241 (1st Cir. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980).
36. The idea was to furnish an incentive for the states to provide benefits to the newly
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amendments to the Federal Act since it was originally passed,37 the
basic statutory scheme has remained intact.38 Periodically, however,
Congess has found it necessary to amend FUTA to keep the Act
attuned to changes in the composition of the work force. 39 As a rule,
the amendments have expanded the scope of the Act's coverage to
include workers who were previously not protected by the federal
guidelines.40
In 1976, Congress adopted a series of major amendments to
FUTA.41 These amendments were grouped into four main categories with the following objectives:42 (1) to extend unemployment
compensation to substantially all wage and salary eamers;43 (2) to
restore solvency to the federal and state programs; (3) to modify the
unemployed worker "at a time when otherwise he would have nothing to spend." Economic
Security Act: Hearings on S. 1130 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
99, 119 (1935) (statement of Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor), quoted in California Dept. of
Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 131 (1971). By maintaining the worker's purchasing
power while he looked for alternative employment, the system served to stabilize the economy
during cycles of high unemployment. See Economic Security Act: Hearings on R.R. 4210
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 172, 182 (1935) (statement
of Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor), quoted in Java, 402 U.S. at 132-33.
37. See, e.g., Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90
Stat. 2667 (1976) (extending coverage to certain previously excluded government employees,
farmworkers and domestic employees); 5 U.S.C. §§ 8521-8525 (1982) (extension ofbenfits to
ex-servicemen in period following the Korean War); see also Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp.
946, 954 (D.S.C. 1980) (citing examples of congressional modification of FUTA to reflect
changes in the work force).
38. See New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 241 (1st
Cir.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980).
39. See note 37 supra. For data on labor force changes during the past 20 years, see CENsus BUREAU, POPULATION PROFILE, supra note l, at 29.
40. See, e.g., Saint Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772,
775 (1981).
41. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90 Stat. 2667
(1976).
42. See S. REP. No. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 5997 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1265, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS]; H.R. REP. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No.
755]. See generally THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PuBuc POLICY REsEARCH,
94th Cong., Rep. No. 10, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AMENDMENTS (1976) (analysis of
key provisions). The House report accompanying the amendments listed the objectives of the
bill:
The Unemployment Compensation Amendments Act of 1975 (H.R. 10210) is designed to
achieve the following objectives:
provide coverage under the permanent Federal-State Unemployment Compensation
law for substantially of all the nation's wage and salary earners and thereby eliminate the
need for the temporary Special Unemployment Assistance program;
restore solvency in the Unemployment Compensation program at the State and Federal levels by increasing revenues in a manner that distributes fairly the impact of additional employer-paid taxes;
modify the "trigger mechanism" in the Extended Benefits program; and
establish a National Study Commission that will undertake a thorough and comprehensive examination of the present Unemployment Compensation program and make
recommendations for further improvements.
H.R. REP. No. 755, supra, at 1.
43. The House Report listed the "major groups of workers that were without permanent
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conditions for the extended benefits program; and (4) to establish a
National Study Commission. The first category of modifications related to benefit eligibility.44 These provisions were designed to extend coverage by eliminating certain impediments to the receipt of
benefits and by providing protection under permanent law to major
groups of workers not covered under the existing law. This section
included a provision prohibiting disbursement of federal unemployment funds to states that deny compensation solely on the basis of
pregnancy,45 which was codified as follows:
§3304. Approval of State Laws
(a) Requirements - The Secretary of Labor shall approve any state
law submitted to him, within 30 days of submission, which he finds
provides that (12) No person shall be denied compensation under such State law
solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy . . . .46

Thus, after 1976, states that denied benefits solely on the basis of
pregnancy were to be ineligible for federal unemployment funds.
Nevertheless, the ambiguity inherent in the language "solely on the
basis of pregnancy" has led to differing interpretations of section
3304(a)(l2).
B. Disparate Interpretations of Section 3304(a)(l2): Brown v.
Porcher
The meaning of section 3304(a)(l2) was subject to judicial scrutiny for the first time in Brown v. Porcher. 41 The plaintiffs initiated a
class action on behalf of themselves and other women who were indefinitely denied unemployment compensation because they left
their last employment as a result ofpregnancy.48 In South Carolina,
women who separated from employment because of pregnancy were
coverage" as: (I) state and local government employees (2) agricultural employees and (3) domestic workers. H.R. REP. No. 755, supra note 42, at 2.
44. See H.R. 10210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. title III, 122 CONG. REc. 22515 (1976).
45. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90 Stat. 2667
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982)).
46. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(l2) (1982).
47. 502 F. Supp. 946 (D.S.C. 1980), modffeed and remanded, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981)
(remand only to consider relief as to named plaintiffs), cert. denied, 459 U.s: 1150 (1983). See
generally 20 J. FAM. L. 572 (1981-82) (summary of Porcher decision).
48. 502 F. Supp. at 947, 952-53. Plaintiff Brown was a dietary aide at a county hospital.
After she began to experience illness and discomfort due to pregnancy, her physician advised
her to cease working if the job became too taxing. Subsequently, Mrs. Brown notified the
hospital and terminated her employment. Shortly after giving birth, she sought to return to
work. At that time she was informed that there were no openings. Plaintiff Johnson was
employed as a salesclerk. She discontinued her employment because of pregnancy-related
physical problems. Mrs. Johnson was also denied reinstatement after the birth of her child.
502 F. Supp. at 948-49; Brief for Appellees at 3-4, Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.
1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellees].
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deemed to have quit voluntarily without good cause.49 Plaintiffs argued that this practice violated section 3304(a)(l2) of FUTA because
it denied benefits to women otherwise able to, and available for,
work solely on the basis of their pregnancy.50 Plaintiffs interpreted
section 3304(a)(12) to require that pregnancy not be the determinative factor in a decision to deny benefits. This interpretation w0uld
compel decertification of plans that deny benefits to women who, but
49. Under South Carolina law a worker is disqualified from receipt of benefits if the South
Carolina Employment Security Commission (S.C.E.S.C.) finds he or she has left his or her
most recent work voluntarily without good cause:
41-35-120. Disqualification for Benefits. Any insured worker shall be ineligible for
benefits:
(l) Leaving work voluntarily-if the Commission finds that he has left voluntarily without good cause his most recent work . . . .
S.C. Com, ANN. § 41-35-120(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1983).
The Supreme Court of South Carolina has held that the words "good cause" mean, in most
cases, a cause connected with the claimant's employment. Sherbert v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286,
125 S.E.2d 737 (1962), revd on other grounds, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Stone Mfg. Co. v. South
Carolina Employment Sec. Comm.n., 219 S.C. 239, 64 S.E.2d 644 (1951).
The S.C.E.S.C. took the position that pregnancy was to be considered a voluntary resignation unrelated to employment and therefore grounds for disqualification. This policy does not
appear in the South Carolina statute itself, but was set forth in official S.C.E.S.C. guidelines.
The relevant portions read:
2. Any individual who voluntarily leaves her most recent work because of pregnancy is
subject to the same disqualification provision of . . . the South Carolina Employment
Security Law as any other individual who voluntarily leaves for a personal reason not
attributable to the employment.
3. An individual who is separated by the employer because of pregnancy will not be
subject to a disqualification period under . . . the Law.
4. A claimant who is separated from an employer because of a policy which provides for
separation of a woman worker after a certain stage of pregnancy will not be subject to any
disqualification under . . . the Law.
5. If an individual accepts a maternity leave of absence for a definite period, the Commission's policy governing leaves of absence will be followed if a claim is filed prior to the
expiration thereof or after the claimant does not report back for duty.
,
S.C.E.S.C. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION INSTRUCTIONS M-135 (Oct. 16, 1972), quoted in
Porcher, 502 F. Supp. at 950-51. Another such publication cited pregnancy as an example of
personal reasons which did not constitute good cause:
The South Carolina Employment Security Law provides in Section 41-35-120(1) that if
the Commission finds that a claimant voluntarily left his most recent employment without
good cause, such claimant shall be ineligible for benefits from the effective date of the
claim and continuing until he has performed services in covered employment . . . . The
South Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted the words "good cause" to mean a cause
attributable to or connected with the claimant's employment. Personal reasons, therefore,
do not constitute good cause for quitting. Examples of such personal reasons are as
follows:
(d) Due to Pregnancy.
The individual who quits because he [sic] is dissatisfied with his job or for personal reasons as stated above will be disqualified for quitting without good cause.
S.C.E.S.C. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BULLETIN No. 236 (Nov. 1977), quoted in
Porcher, 502 F. Supp. at 951.
50. Brief for Appellees, supra note 48, at 10; Porcher, 502 F. Supp. at 953. The plaintiffs'
claim involved only those women who were actively seeking work during or shortly after pregnancy. It did not address the claims of women who were unavailable for employment or
unable to work during pregnancy. See Brief In Opposition To Certiorari at 2, Porcher v.
Brown, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Brief In Opposition To Certiorari] (denial of
certiorari); Brief for Appellees, supra note 48, at I n.1.
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for the fact that they left work because of pregnancy, would be allowed to receive benefits.51
The South Carolina Employment Security Commission
(S.C.E.S.C.) officials named as defendants in the suit maintained
that the state did not deny compensation solely on the basis of pregnancy because it treated pregnancy like any other medical condition
unrelated to employment.52 Under this view, section 3304(a)(12) prohibits the state from singling out pregnancy for disfavorable treatment, but as long as pregnancy is not an exclusive category for
determining ineligibility for benefits, the requirements of section
3304(a)(12) are satisfied.53 Further, the Commission contended that
South Carolina was not in violation of FUTA because it followed
the interpretation advanced by the Department of Labor, which had
repeatedly certified South Carolina's plan.54
The district court held that South Carolina's policy of denying
51. The plaintiffs argued that the statutory language "solely on the basis of pregnancy," see
text at note 46 supra, was used precisely to prevent states from denying benefits to women who
are unemployed because they left work due to pregnancy. See Brief In Opposition To Certiorari, supra note 50, at 3-4.
52. Brief for Appellants at 10-14, Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants).
In support of its position, the S.C.E.S.C. pointed out that some pregnancy-related claims
were paid: for example, if an employer fired a woman because of pregnancy. The commission
contended that if claims were being denied solely on the basis of pregnancy, then no pregnancy-related claims would have been paid. Id. at 13. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
however, essentially makes it unlawful to discharge an employee because of pregnancy. 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(I), 2000e(k) (1982). Thus, as a practical matter, the S.C.E.S.C.'s policy of
denying pregnancy-related claims extended to most women who would presumably be covered
by 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12).
Despite the S.C.E.S.C. contention that some pregnancy-related claims were paid, the district court in Porcher determined that for all practical purposes all cases involving pregnant
women were subject to the same policy of disqualification. The court cited many examples of
pregnant women who were discharged from employment or separated because their work involved health hazards and who were denied compensation under South Carolina's policy. 502
F. Supp. at 951 & n.10.
53. The United States argued that "[u]se of the word 'solely' indicates that Congress meant
to ban only those state laws that single out pregnancy for disadvantageous treatment.'' Amicus
Curiae Brief, supra note 10, at 8. Under this interpretation a plan that treated pregnancy as
any other medical condition would satisfy the FUTA requirements.
54. On October 31, 1979, pursuant to § 3304(c), the Secretary of Labor certified South
Carolina's unemployment compensation plan as being in compliance with FUTA. Brief for
Appellants, supra note 52, at 24 (citing Joint Appendix at 123-26, Porcher v. Brown, 660 F,2d
1001 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Joint App.]).
Although the Department of Labor did not formally announce its interpretation of
§ 3304(a)(l2), during the Porcher case the S.C.E.S.C. submitted a letter at trial discussing the
Department's interpretation. In its letter to the S.C.E.S.C., the Department of Labor maintained that "[a]s long as a State is determining eligibility of pregnant claimants under the State
law in the same manner as it is determining the eligibility of other claimants . . . that State
law so applied is consistent with 3304(a)(l2), FUTA.'' Joint App., supra note 54, at 131.
Neither court in Porcher afforded the letter great evidentiary weight. 660 F.2d at 1004-05; 502
F. Supp. at 957 n.20. However, the letter can be seen as representing the Labor Department's
continued understanding of§ 3304(a)(l2). The Solicitor General, in his brief for the United
States as amicus curiae, relied on the letter as evidence of the Labor Department's interpretation. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 10, at 12-13.
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benefits to otherwise eligible workers because they left their last employment for medical reasons associated with pregnancy violated the
Federal Act. 55 The court maintained that receipt of unemployment
benefits by a woman actively seeking work after childbirth should
not be subject to the whim and calculations of the employer. Rather,
FUTA requires respect for an individualized medical decision that a
pregnant woman must stop work to avoid job-related exposure to
health hazards or to attend to the biological imperatives of childbirth.56 The court accepted the plaintiffs' interpretation of section
33O4(a)(l2), noting that "[i]n plain, unambiguous language, Congress imposed a sweeping ban on the use of pregnancy or its termination as an excuse for denying benefits to otherwise eligible
women." 57
The Fourth Circuit, on appeal, affirmed the district court's holding.58 The circuit court also found the statutory mandate to be clear
and unambiguous: "[R]egardless of how the Commission treats employees with other disabilities, . . . [it] cannot deny compensation
'solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy.' " 59
The court stated that the Secretary's certification of South Carolina's
law was "neither controlling nor entitled to great weight," noting
that the allegedly offensive practice did not appear on the face of the
law.60 Thus, the court believed that the Secretary's certification may
have been a summary approval of the statutory language without
examination of actual state practice.
The S.C.E.S.C. applied to the United States Supreme Court for
relief from the decision below.61 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.62 Justice White, joined by two other justices, wrote a sharp dissent. Justice White maintained that the direct conflict between the
Department of Labor's position and the Fourth Circuit's holding
represents, at a minimum, the existence of substantial uncertainty in
an area of great practical significance to the states, the Department
of Labor and large numbers of pregnant women.63
55. The district court expressly stated that "[t]he policies and practices of the South Carolina Employment Security Commission are declared to be in direct contravention of26 U.S.C.
§ 3304(a)(l2)." 502 F. Supp. at 958. In so holding, the court found it unnecessary to consider
constitutional claims raised by the plaintiffs. 502 F. Supp. at 958 n.22.
56. 502 F. Supp. at 957.
57. 502 F. Supp. at 955 (emphasis omitted).
58. 660 F.2d at 1007. The Fourth Circuit, however, modified the judgment with respect to
the individual awards. The case was then remanded for further proceedings consistent with
the circuit court's opinion.
59. 660 F.2d at 1004.
60. 660 F.2d at 1004.
61. Porcher v. Brown,pelilionfar cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3882 (U.S. May 16, 1982) (No. 811972).
62. Porcher v. Brown, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983).
63. Justice White,joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, th'?ught three major aspects of
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STATUTORY ANALYSIS

Weight to he Accorded the Secretary of Labor's Certification
Plans that Group Pregnancy with Other Medical
Conditions

of

Ordinarily, the process of interpreting a statutory provision begins with the language itself,64 read with reference to applicable canons of statutory construction.65 In conjunction with the canons, it is
usually considered appropriate to consult the legislative history66 for
insight into the intended meaning of the words chosen by the legislathe Porcher decision deserved consideration: (1) the conflicting interpretations of§ 3304(a)(l2)
advanced by the Secretary of Labor and the Fourth Circuit; (2) the relevance of the eleventh
amendment to the decision; and (3) the availability ofa cause of action under42 U.S.C. § 1983
to redress the state's failure to comply with§ 3304(a)(l2). 459 U.S. at 1151-54.
64. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971) ("Not wishing 'to give point to
the quip that only when legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute; we begin by
looking to the text itself.' ") (citing Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading ofStatutes, 47
CoLUM. L. REv. 527,543 (1947)); March v. United States, 506 F.2d 1306, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
("When a court construes a statute, the starting point must be the language of the statute.");
GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 716 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972) ("We
are well aware of the first catechism of statutory construction which teaches that we should
begin the process of interpretation with 'the language of the statute itself.'") (citing Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420 (1968)).
65. See, e.g., Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 269 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Whether Congress so intended, of course, is a question of statutory interpretation to be resolved by reference
to the language of the statute, its legislative history, and the canons of statutory construction.'');
In re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 658 F.2d 1149, 1157 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1000 (1982) ("In reaching this conclusion, we must reference appropriate canons and maxims
- of statutory construction . . . .").
66. See, e.g., District of Columbia Natl. Bank v. District of Columbia, 348 F.2d 808, 810
(D.C. Cir. 1965) ("And since the judicial function is to ascertain the legislative intention the
Court may properly exercise that function with recourse to the legislative history . . . .'');
United States v. Hepp, 497 F. Supp. 348, 349 (N.D. Iowa 1980), affd., 656 F.2d 350 (1981)
("[E]ven though the statute appears clear on its face, inquiry must not stop there, but rather the
court must also examine the statutory scheme and legislative history . . . .''). It is often stated,
however, that resort to the legislative history is appropriate only when the words of the statute
are ambiguous. See, e.g., Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors Comm., 454 U.S. 354, 359-60
(1982) ("It is elementary that the meaning of the statute must, in the first instance, be sought in
the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts
is to enforce it according to its terms.") (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485
(1917)); Albright v. United States, 631 F.2d 915,918 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("If the language is clear
and unambiguous, a court must give effect to its plain meaning.'') (citations omitted). Other
courts recognize, however, that words are rarely so clear so as to be subject to only one meaning. See, e.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 157 (1972) ("But, while the
clear meaning of statutory language is not to be ignored, 'words are inexact tools at best,' and
hence it is essential that we place the words of a statute in their proper context by resort to the
legislative history.") (quoting Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476,479 (1943)); Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 505 F.2d 527, 533 n.17 (7th Cir. 1974) ("But words are
inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to
legislative history no matter how 'clear the words may appear on "superficial examination."'") (quoting Harrison, 317 U.S. 479 (1943)). In any event, any claim that§ 3304(a)(l2)
is unambiguous on its face is academic given that the department charged with its administration and the Fourth Circuit subscribed to divergent interpretations of the section. Cf. GAF
Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 716 n.14 (2d Cir. 1971) (meaning of term not considered plain
when judges in two recent cases did not agree on meaning), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
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ture. 67 By charging the Department of Labor with the administration of the provision, however, the framework of FUTA requires a
reviewing court to start at a different point. The court must begin by
ascertaining the proper weight to attach to the position taken by the
Secretary, as representative of the charged department.68 If, for example, the Secretary's :findings should be considered conclusive by
law, then the practical significance of investigating alternative interpretations is diminished. As a general proposition, many courts state
that interpretation of a statute by an agency entrusted with its implementation is entitled to great weight.69 This rule, however, is infrequently applied in the absolute.7° For example, the general rule is
often qualified to read that the agency's interpretation is to be upheld absent "compelling indications that it is wrong" 71 or evidence
67. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420 (1973) ("[W]ords generally have
different shades of meaning, and are to be construed if reasonably possible to effectuate the
intent of the lawmakers .•..") (quoting Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 258 (1937));
Colorado Pub. Interest Group, Inc., v. Train, 507 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir. 1974), revd. on other
grounds, 426 U.S. 1 (1975) ("It is a basic rule of statutory construction that statutes are to be
construed in a manner so as to effectuate the intent of the enacting body . . . .").
68. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a), (c) (1982). See note 52 supra. FUTA provides for judicial review
in 26 U.S.C. § 3310 (1982). Section 3310(a) indicates that any state denied certification by the
Secretary may file for review in the United States Court of Appeals. Section 3310(c) authorizes the court to set aside or affirm the Secretary's actions.
69. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (" 'The administrative
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency . . . [is] entitled to great deference.'") (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,
367-68 (1974) (" 'When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great
deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration.'") (quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)); Hamilton v. Butz, 520
F.2d 709, 714 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Courts accord 'great weight' only to the interpretations given a
statute by the agency charged with the statute's administration.''); Budd Co. v. OSHA, 513
F.2d 201,204 (3d Cir. 1975) (per curiam) ("In dealing with questions regarding the interpretation of statutes or regulations . . . committed to a federal administrative agency . . . federal
courts are obliged to accord 'great deference' to the agency's construction . . . .''). See generally 5 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 51.01 (1983) (discussion of
judicial review of findings of law and fact).
70. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive, 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (although Commission's
judgment is entitled to great weight, in the last analysis the legal standard is a matter of judicial construction); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945) (reviewing
courts need not merely accept Board's conclusions); Thompson v. Clifford, 408 F.2d 154, 167
(D.C. Cir. 1968) ("Administrative construction is less potent . . . where it does not rest upon
matters peculiarly within the administrator's field of expertise."). But see Morris v. Gressette,
432 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1977) (Congress authorized the Attorney General to perform a
preclearance review of a state's voting laws under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act as an "expeditious alternative to declaratory judgment actions," and since '1udicial review of the Attorney
General's actions would unavoidably extend this period, it is necessarily precluded.'').
71. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (''This principle is given
special force by the equally venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those
charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is
wrong . . . .''). This language from Red Lion has been quoted frequently. See, e.g., New
York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,421 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting
Sys. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121 (1973); Ute Indian Tribe v. Probst, 428 F.2d
491, 497 (10th Cir. 1970).
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that it is "plainly erroneous" 72 or "clearly wrong." 73
In instances in which the statutory grant of power to an agency is
very broad or confers a wide degree of discretion, the courts are
more likely to defer to agency determination.74 Courts have afforded great deference in cases involving a charged agency's initial
interpretation of an undefined central statutory term.. 75 Similarly, if
the agency has interpreted a provision in the same manner for many
years, the courts are normally reluctant to substitute their own judgment.76 This is especially true when Congress has reenacted the legislation with no attempt to modify agency practice.77
In cases in which the statutory language is relatively precise, yet
still allows for some agency discretion, courts tend to examine the
72. United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977) (" '[T]he ultimate criterion is the
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'") (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
U.S. 410, 414 (1945)); Beatty v. Schweiker, 678 F.2d 359, 360 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Indeed, we will
uphold the Secretary's interpretation of the regulations 'unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s).' ") (quoting Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414).
73. Stevens v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 1971) ("As the agency charged
. . . Interior's interpretation is entitled to 'great weight' and 'is not to be overturned unless
clearly wrong . . . .'")(quoting United States v. Jackson, 280 U.S. 183, 193 (1930)); see also
R.V. McGinnis Theatres & Pay T.V., Inc. v. Video Indep. Theatres, Inc., 386 F.2d 592, 594
(10th Cir. 1967) (if administrative construction of a statute is clearly wrong, it is the duty of the
court to so find).
74. See, e.g., Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977) (express delegation to Secretary of power to prescribe regulations); Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288
U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (Tariff Commission authorized to adopt such reasonable procedures, rules
and regulations as it may deem necessary); Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 933 (3d Cir.
1982) ("Secretary is accorded full power to make rules and regulations and to establish
procedures").
75. See, e.g., Unemployment Compensation Commn. v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946)
(definition oflabor dispute in "active progress"); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S.
111, 131 (1944) (definition of term "employee").
76. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 18 (1965) (" 'It therefore comes within the rule
that the practical construction given to an act of Congress . . . by those charged . . . is entitled
to great respect and, if acted upon for a number of years, will not be disturbed except for
cogent reasons.'") (quoting McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1921)); Universal
Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580,583 (1930) (''This construction of those terms has
been adhered to in the Internal Revenue Bureau for about ten years and it ought not to be
disturbed now unless it be plainly wrong."); West v. Bergland, 611 F.2d 710, 720-21 (8th Cir.
1979) (''The substance of the current regulation and its predecessor . . . has been in effect for
about thirty years . . . . Absent 'compelling indications' that the Secretary is wrong, his longstanding interpretation . . . is entitled to great deference.").
77. See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979) (When "an
agency's statutory construction has been 'fully brought to the attention of the public and Congress,' and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation although it has amended the
statute in other respects, then presumably the legislative intent has been correctly discerned.")
(quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940)); Board of Governors of the
Fed. Res. Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 248-49 (1978) ("[A]n agency's longstanding construction of its statutory mandate is entitled to great respect, 'especially when
Congress has refused to alter [. . .) construction.'") (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)). But cf. March v. United States, 506 F.2d 1306, 1315 n.37
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (when meaning of statute is plain, subsequent reenactment does not signify
adoption of administrative construction).
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agency's determinations with greater scrutiny.78 The Supreme
Court's decision in Skidmore v. Sw!ft & Co.79 indicates that courts
are to evaluate the action of a charged agency by taking into consideration all factors which affect the persuasiveness of the agency's
conclusion. 80 In particular, courts in such cases frequently examine
agency action for its compatibility with congressional purpose. The
Supreme Court has stated on several occasions that reviewing courts
are not required to accept agency decisions that are plainly inconsistent with legislative intent or policy, 81 especially when such policy
has been clearly articulated. 82
In the specific case of section 33O4(a)(l2), the Secretary must determine if the state is denying benefits "solely on the basis of pregnancy."83 On the whole, this language is relatively straightforward.
The only term that could reasonably be subject to more than one
contextual interpretation is the word "solely." 84 Because "solely" is
not one of the key definitional phrases under the statute and the Secretary's interpretation is relatively recent, adherence to the general
78. See United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 799 (1969) (statute imprecise in differentiating a "drug" from a "device"; therefore, Secretary's interpretation upheld as reasonable in light of statutory purpose); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) (case-bycase determinations by the administrator as to whether waiting time was working time under
the Fair Labor Standards Act entitled to some deference because of experience and knowledge
accumulated in the course of his duties).
79. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
80. 323 U.S. at 140. (''The weight of such [an agency] judgment in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control."). The Swift standard for evaluating agency action has
been quoted frequently. See, e.g., Federal Maritime Bd. v. Ibrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 499500 (1958); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,903 n.7 (11th Cir. 1982); Mercy Hosp. &
Medical Center v. Harris, 625 F.2d 905, 907 (9th Cir. 1980); Usery v. Columbia Univ., 568
F.2d 953, 963 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977).
81. See Espinosa v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973) (''The Commission's more
recent interpretation of the statute . . . is no doubt entitled to great deference, but that deference must have limits where, as here, application of the guideline would be inconsistent with
an obvious congressional intent . . . .") (citation omitted); Volkwagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968) ("But the courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction . . . and 'are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of
administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate
the congressional policy underlying a statute.'") (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291
(1965)).
82. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 165-66 (1941) ("As a standard, the
Board must comply also with the requirement that the unit selected must be one to effectuate
the policy of the act . . . . Where the policy of an act is so definitely and elaborately stated,
this requirement acts as a permitted measure of delegated authority.'').
83. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982).
84. The district court in Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. 946, 955 (D.S.C. 1980), modffied
and remanded, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983), found that the
statute unambiguously prohibited the use of pregnancy to deny benefits to otherwise eligible
women. See text at note 57 supra. The Fourth Circuit, affirming the district court's decision,
believed that the statute was so clear on its face that resort to the legislative history was unnecessary. 660 F.2d at 1004.
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rule granting the charged agency's determination great deference is
unnecessary. In addition, reviewing courts need not afford great deference to an agency's interpretation of statutory language if construction of that language does not require experience or expertise
peculiar to the charged agency. 85 Thus, although the Secretary's interpretation is to be taken into consideration, it should not be viewed
as dispositive. This conclusion is consistent with the principle that
statutory construction is properly a function of the judicial branch. 86
Administration or implementation of a statute may be vested in an
agency, but in the final analysis, the courts have the power to interpret statutory enactments. Because certification by the Secretary of
Labor of state plans that group pregnancy with other medical conditions is not necessarily dispositive, analysis of section 3304(a)(12) requires attention to the standard means of statutory interpretation. 87

B. The Language of Section 3304(a)(l2)
Congressional intent in enacting section 3304(a)(12) must be determined in the context of the issues considered by Congress. At the
time of the introduction of the bills that became the 1976 amendments to FUTA, several claims of pregnancy-related sex discrimination in employment were pending in the federal courts. 88 Of
particular relevance is Turner v. .Department of Employment Security. 89 In Turner, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a state statute
85. SeeTown of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215,220 (1st Cir. 1981); Brennan v. General Tel. Co., 488 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1973).
86. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive, 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) ("[W]hile informed judicial
determination is dependent upon enlightenment gained from administrative experience, in the
last analysis the words 'deceptive practices' set forth a legal standard and they must get their
final meaning from judicial construction."); Young v. AAA Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382,
1385 (M.D.N.C. 1972) ("Administrative interpretations of statutes are not to be followed in
every instance, but are only helpful guides to aid the courts in their task of statutory construction. The ultimate authorities on issues of statutory interpretation are the courts.") (citations
omitted).
87. See generally2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 45 (C. Sands 4th ed.
1973). See also notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dept. ofWater and Power, 553 F.2d 581 (9th
Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (pension plan contributions); Satty v.
Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), qffd in part, vacated in part and remanded, 434
U.S. 136 (1977) (maternity leave and seniority accumulation); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co.,
519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), revd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (exclusion of pregnancy from employer
disability insurance plans) (overruled by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)). During the 1970's,
increased participation by women accounted for 60% of the growth of the country's work force.
CENSUS BUREAU, MONEY INCOME, supra note 2, at 3. The biggest increase was recorded for
women within the peak childbearing years - from ages 25 to 34. S. KAMERMAN, supra note 4,
at 7. This influx of women into the labor force was accompanied by an increase in litigation
challenging employment practices that allegedly discriminated on the basis of sex. See generally Cook, The Burger Court and Women's Rights 1971-1977, and Ginsburg, Women, Men, and
the Constitution: Key Supreme Court Rulings, in NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, Pun.
No. R0037, WOMEN IN THE CouRTS 21-46, 47-83 (1978) (discussing judicial trends in decisions affecting the rights of women).
89. 531 P.2d 870 (Utah), vacated and remanded per curiam, 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
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which conclusively presumed pregnant women to be incapacitated
and therefore ineligible for unemployment compensation for a period before and after giving birth.90 One month after the introduction of the 1976 amendments,91 the United States Supreme Court
vacated and remanded on the ground that the provision did not satisfy the substantive due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment.92 Those who argue that Congress meant to ban only
state laws that single out pregnancy as a criterion for denying benefits contend that section 3304(a)(12) was a response to the Turner
case and merely codifies the Turner result in striking down presumptions based on pregnancy. However, an examination of the language
of the statute, applicable canons of construction and the legislative
history leads to the conclusion that Congress had more than this narrow purpose in mind.
Section 3304(a)(l2) prohibits disbursement of federal funds to
states that deny benefits "solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy." The word "solely," given its plain and ordinary definition, means "to the exclusion of all else." 93 Section
3304(a)(l2), then, forbids disqualification from being determined on
the basis of pregnancy alone. This literal reading unfortunately does
little to resolve the issue of proper application of the provision. The
section is still open to the two divergent constructions argued in
Porcher, 94 but the language used and the structure of the statute support the conclusion that Congress intended to prohibit the use of
pregnancy as a determinative factor in denying unemployment
benefits.
The language of section 3304(a)(12) is very broad.95 If Congress
90. 531 P.2d at 871. The Utah statute at issue, UTAH CooE ANN.§ 35-4-5, U.C.A. 1953
(Repl. 46), deemed a woman leaving work ineligible for benefits for 12 weeks before and 6
weeks after childbirth. 531 P.2d at 870.
91. H.R. 10210 was introduced in October 1975. H.R. 10210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Turner in November 1975.
92. The Court reasoned that presumptive disability for purposes of unemployment compensation suffered from the same constitutional infirmity as mandatory maternity leave provisions. Two years earlier in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1973), the Court
had decided that a policy prohibiting school teachers from working for a period before and
after childbirth violated the due process clause on the ground that the Constitution requires a
more individualized determination of physical capacity. In Turner, the Court concluded that
The presumption of incapacity and unavailability for employment created by the challenged provision is virtually identical to the presumption found unconstitutional in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaF/eur . . . .
. . . The Fourteenth Amendment requires that unemployment compensation boards
no less than school boards must achieve legitimate state ends through more individualized
means when basic human liberties are at stake.
423 U.S. at 46 (citation omitted).
93. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1097 (8th ed. 1980); see also Reply of Respondents to Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Porcher v. Brown, 459 U.S.
1150 (1983) (denial of certiorari) (citing Webster's).
94. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text.
95. See text at note 46 supra.
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had intended merely to codify the Turner result or, for that matter, to
ban presumptive disability periods of any length, it could easily have
stated that such presumptive disability periods were to be prohibited.
There would have been no need to resort to such general language to
remedy a specific problem.96
In addition, Congress changed the language of the section that
eventually became section 3304(a)(l2) between the introduction of
the bills and the final adoption of the statute. The original draft proposed that the states be prohibited from denying compensation
"solely on the basis of pregnancy" and from determining voluntary
termination, availability, active search for work and refusal of work
"in a manner which discriminat[ed] on the basis of pregnancy." 97
The version that was eventually codified eliminated most of the expository language, retaining only the portion that prohibited denial
of benefits "solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of
pregnancy." 98
As a matter of statutory construction, a change in the words used
from one draft to the next is generally assumed to be by design. 99
Here the excluded clause disallowed evaluation of the ordinary eligibility criteria 100 in a way which prejudicially considered pregnancy.
The legislative history contains no express indication of the reasons
why section 3304(a)(12) was modified. However, if the intent was to
create a statute that merely prohibited differentiation between pregnancy and other medical conditions, then the language relating to
96. The Fourth Circuit in Porcher rejected the S.C.E.S.C.'s argument that Congress, in
enacting § 3304(a)(12), sought to eliminate Turner-type statutes that contained shorter periods
of presumptive disability. The circuit court maintained that
[i]f Congress had intended, as the Commission argues, only to codify the Turner decision
and take the additional step of barring discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, it could
easily have drafted a statute reflecting those limited purposes. Instead, it broadly provided that "[n]o person shall be denied compensation under . . . state law solely on the
basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy."
660 F.2d at 1004 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(l2) (1982)).
97. The provision in the 1975 Bill reads:
No person shall be denied compensation solely on the basis of pregnancy and determinations under any provision of such State law relating to voluntary termination of employment, availability for work, active search for work, or refusal to accept work shall not be
made in a manner which discriminates on the basis of pregnancy.
S. 2079, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1975); H.R. 8366, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1975),
98. H.R. 10210, 94th Cong., !st Sess. 312 (1975), cited in H.R. REP. No. 755, supra note 42,
at 66.
99. Cf. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980) ("Few
principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress
does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of
other language.''); Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 337 (1930) ("The deliberate selection of
language so differing from that used in the earlier Acts indicates that a change of law was
intended."); Klein v. Republic Steel Corp., 435 F.2d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1970) ("It is a canon
of statutory construction that where as here the words of a later statute differ from those of a
previous one on the same or a related subject, the legislature must have intended them to have
a different meaning.'').
100. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
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discriminatory consideration of the various factors would have been
extremely relevant. Instead, that language was discarded between
bills without any recorded debate. In addition, Congress certainly
was not unaware of the possibility of grouping pregnancy with other
disabilities and, when so disposed, was able to spell out clearly that
intent. 101
As a general proposition, when Congress alters and then codifies
a section, it intends the clause to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the general tenor of the statute as a whole. 102 The introductory remarks at the hearings on the first draft of the 1976
amendments evinced congressional intent to improve the unemployment compensation system in order to provide a better source of protection for the nation's workers, 103 a goal consistent with both the
general aims of FUTA 104 and the trend toward expansion offederal
coverage. 105 The codified version of section 3304(a)(l2) must be
read in light of these remedial purposes, 106 which weigh against any
presumption that Congress altered the section to limit its application.
Generally, courts have taken the position that remedial legislation is
to be liberally construed 107 and any exceptions to such legislation
narrowly interpreted. 108 In particular, it has been stated that a re101. Two years after § 3304(a)(l2) was adopted, Congress amended the Federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Act to state explicitly that ''women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated for all employment-related purposes . . .
as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." Pub. L. 95555, § I, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)).
102. The unchanged sections and the amendment must generally be given "the most harmonious comprehensive meaning possible ...• To do otherwise would be to impute to Congress a purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to promote with the other." Clark v.
Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1947); see also Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S.
404,411 (1945); 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 87, at§§ 22.35, 46.05.
103. See Phase Ill: Proposed Changes in the Permanent Federal-State Unemployment Compensation Programs, Before the Subcomm. on Unemployment Compensation of the Comm. on
Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975) (statement of James Corman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Unemployment Compensation).
104. See notes 35-38 supra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
106. Remedial statutes are generally those which afford or improve remedies and those
which correct defects in civil institutions and state administration. Modern social legislation is
generally characterized as remedial. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 87, at§ 60.02.
107. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,336 (1967) ("In addition, we are guided
by the familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed
broadly to effectuate its purposes."); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523,
533 (1967) ("[T]his view . . . seems compelled by the language of the present statute, which is
remedial and to be liberally construed.").
108. See, e.g., A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945) (in referring to the
Fair Labor Standards Act, the Court stated: "Any exemption from such humanitarian and
remedial legislation must therefore be narrowly construed .•.."); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743, 748 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 484 (1983) (stating that
exceptions to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act should be narrowly interpreted "because of the general maxim that exceptions to a remedial statute are to be 'narrowly and
strictly construed.'") (quoting Sexton v. Beatrice Foods Co., 630 F.2d 478, 486 (7th Cir. 1980)).
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strictive interpretation of the reach of federal statutes governing unemployment compensation would violate the broad purposes of the
federal legislation. 1o9
The position of section 3304(a)(l2) in the overall structure of the
109. See Henry Broderick, Inc. v. Squire, 163 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1947). The Ninth Circuit
relied on the basic policies and purpose of the Social Security Act, which at the time included
compensation for the unemployed, to hold that brokers should be classified as "independent
contractors" rather than "employees" for purposes of social security and federal unemployment taxes: "[I]t has been consistently held that a narrow and legalistic interpretation of the
scope of the Act here in question would not be in conformance with the broad purposes of
federal social security legislation." 163 F.2d at 982.
Although it is apparent that Congress intended the Federal Act to serve as a comprehensive
remedy, it is important to note Congress' concurrent interest in preserving state responsibility
for unemployment compensation. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor,
566 F.2d 388, 392-93 (2d Cir. 1977), qffd, 440 U.S. 519 (1979) (upholding a state statutory
provision permitting the payment of unemployment compensation to individuals involved in
labor disputes). The New York Telephone Co. court attached great importance to the fact that
Congress did not forbid payments to striking workers despite pressure to do so. It quoted from
a 1935 committee report that accompanied the original federal unemployment compensation
act: "Except for a few standards which are necessary to render certain that the State unemployment compensation laws are genuine unemployment compensation acts and not merely
relief measures, the States are left free to set up any unemployment compensation system they
wish, without dictation from Washington." 566 F.2d at 392 (quoting S. REP, No. 628, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935)). The Second Circuit noted that expressed "congressional intent to
avoid excessive intrusion into local affairs [was] entirely consistent with the doubt that existed
at that time concerning Congress' power to enact legislation of this character without encroaching to an unconstitutional degree on the powers of the States." 566 F.2d at 393; see also
Florida AFL-CIO v. Florida Dept. of Labor & Employment Sec., 504 F. Supp. 530, 532-33
(N.D. Fla. 1980), qffd, 616 F.2d 513 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing the Supreme Court's decision in
New York Telephone Co. for the proposition that the Social Security Act of 1935 placed great
emphasis on state autonomy in the formulation of unemployment compensation plans). The
legislative history accompanying the 1976 amendments reiterated congressional respect for the
restraints that federalism places on control of unemployment compensation by the federal
government. See, e.g., 122 CoNG. REc. H22521 (daily ed. July 19, 1976) (statement of Rep.
Frenzel) (praising the Ways and Means Committee's restraint in not suggesting a federal benefit standard).
These concerns for federalism have a distinct practical significance when potential increases in a state's financial responsibility to its citizens are at issue. See Amicus Curiae Brief,
supra note 10, at 14 (citing Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471,484,
492-93 (1977)). Eligibility requirements have been considered the province of the states at
least in part because Congress and the states were concerned with the fiscal integrity of state
plans and the possibility that states might over-extend themselves. Cf. National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52, 855 (1976) (tenth amendment held to be a limitation on
federal government's power under the commerce clause to interfere in areas affecting essential
state functions). But c.f. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240
(1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980) (upholding provision of the 1976 amendments
to FUTA requiring states to extend coverage to state employees against tenth amendment
attack). For a comparison of the Usery and Marshall decisions, see IS SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
381 (1981).
The key question is what balance Congress sought to strike between preservation of state
autonomy and federal regulation. In 1937, in Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937), the Supreme Court, interpreting the newly enacted federal unemployment statute, asserted that the states were to be afforded a wide range of discretion as long as they did not
depart from those standards which Congress had deemed fundamental. 301 U.S. at 593-94.
Congress had created a general framework of federal control by imposing a series of standards
with which states desirous of federal aid must comply. As long as these threshold standards
are not violated, a state is free to create any type of compensation plan it wishes, without
jeopardizing its claim for federal funds. 301 U.S. at 593-94. See also Marshall, 616 F.2d at 246
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statute also argues for a generous interpretation of the provision. It
is significant that the federal guidelines prohibiting denial of benefits
solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy are
listed among the seventeen requisites for approval of state laws. 110
Courts have identified the guidelines set forth in section 3304(a) as
the standards that Congress considered fundamental. 111 The entire
system of federal leverage over state plans hinges on state compliance with these guidelines. To construe these fundamental federal
standards narrowly would effectively permit the states to evade the
basic purposes of FUTA. Plans that label a woman's separation
from work because of pregnancy as a voluntary termination of employment without good case in essence act indirectly to deny benefits
on the basis of pregnancy, when a state clearly could not do so
directly.
To summarize, interpretation of the section as requiring only that
pregnancy be treated like any other medical condition would essentially read the provision as enunciating a prohibition on discriminatory treatment of pregnancy. Acceptance of this interpretation
would resurrect language expressly discarded by Congress. It is a
basic principle of statutory construction that words of a statute are
not to be disregarded in favor of an earlier but uncodi.fied version. 112
Further, the contention that Congress intended a broader remedy
than one that simply prohibited the states from singling out pregnancy for adverse treatment is consistent with the remedial purposes
of the 1976 amendments and of FUTA in general. 113
C.

The Legislative History

The legislative history of the 1976 amendments and of FUTA in
general is well documented. As the Fourth Circuit observed in
(rejecting claim that state's option to comply with federal standards is illusory: "We do not
agree that the carrot has become a club because rewards for conformity have increased.").
This general relationship offederal-state control envisioned by the 1935 Act has essentially
remained intact, except to the extent that Congress has increased federal dominion over unemployment compensation plans. q: Marshall, 616 F.2d at 241; see also note 42 supra and accompanying text. The First Circuit added in Marshall that "We must also recognize that,
since 1935, the philosophy and objective of the unemployment compensation program, viz.,
that unemployment is a national problem that must be dealt with on a national basis, have
been woven into the fabric of our society." 616 F.2d at 246.
In sum, although Congress was concerned with allowing the states latitude to control unemployment compensation, when the fundamental federal standards of§ 3304(a) are at issue,
the federal guidelines are to take precedence. The argument that the states should be allowed
to experiment with plans that treat pregnancy in innovative ways is unconvincing given that
Congress placed the prohibition against denial of benefits on the basis of pregnancy among the
fundamental federal standards of§ 3304(a).
110. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(l)-(17) (1982).
11 I. See note 32 supra.
112. See note 99 supra.
113. See notes 34-45 supra and accompanying text.
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Porcher, however, the legislative history of section 3304(a)(l2) itself
is "scant." 114 Neither the statute nor the available legislative history
expressly indicates whether Congress, in using the word "solely,"
sought to ban all statutes that deny benefits on the basis of pregnancy or only those provisions that single out pregnancy for adverse
treatment. Examination of the legislative history of section
3304(a)(l2) and of FUTA in general, however, leads to the conclusion that Congress meant to eliminate pregnancy as a determinative
factor in disqualification decisions.
One of the arguments used to support a narrow reading of section 3304(a)(12) is that the report of the Senate Finance Committee
on the 1976 amendments, 115 presented several months after Turner,
specifically refers to the case. 116 It is thus apparent that Congress
was aware of statutes, such as Utah's, which contained conclusive
presumptions of incapacity. The Labor Department maintains that
this evidences congressional intent to eradicate only the specific infirmity illustrated by the Utah statute. 117 However, several considerations weigh against adopting such a narrow view of congressional
purpose.
The passage of the Senate report that refers to the Turner decision begins by listing three requisites for qualification for unemployment compensation. A worker must demonstrate that he or she is
114. 660 F.2d at 1004.
115. S. REP. No. 1265, 1976 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 5997, supra note 42. The
Committee's report is dated September 20, 1976.
116. The report reads:
D. Provisions Related to Benefit Eligibility Disqualification for Pregnancy
(Sec. 302 of the Bill)

In order to qualify for unemployment compensation benefits, a worker must be able to
work, be seeking employment, and be available for employment. In a number of States,
an individual whose unemployment is related to pregnancy is barred from receiving any
unemployment benefits. In 1975 the Supreme Court found a provision of this type in the
Utah unemployment compensation statute to be unconstitutional. The Utah requirement
had disqualified workers for a period of 18 weeks (12 weeks before birth through 6 weeks
after birth). The Court stated that "a conclusive presumption of incapacity during so long
a period before and after childbirth is constitutionally invalid." A number of other States
have similar provisions although most appear to involve somewhat shorter periods of disqualification.
The co=ittee bill includes, without modification, the provision of the House bill
which would prohibit States from continuing to enforce any provision which denies unemployment compensation benefits solely on the basis of pregnancy (or recency of pregnancy). Pregnant individuals would, however, continue to be required to meet generally
applicable criteria of availability for work and ability to work.
S. REP. No. 1265, at 19, 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, at 6013, 6015,
supra note 42.
117. The Solicitor General interpreted the above-mentioned passage from the Senate report as "suggest[ing] not that Congress intended to require preferential treatment of pregnancy, but only that it was concerned with elimination of a variety of automatic pregnancy
disqualification provisions contained in state laws at that time." See Amicus Curiae Brief,
supra note 10, at 10-11.
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able to work, is seeking work and is available for work. 118 The report then describes the facts of the Turner case as an example of a
state statute that denies compensation in cases of pregnancy-related
unemployment. 119 The implication is that three main factors are to
be considered and that the conclusive presumption employed in
Utah demonstrates an impermissible bypass of those factors. 120 This
interpretation is supported by the fact that the succeeding paragraph
concludes with a reaffirmation that "[p]regnant individuals would,
however, continue to be required to meet generally applicable criteria of availability for work and ability to work." 121
Similarly, the House report accompanying the bill mentions, with
apparent approval, eligibility provisions applicable to "all claimants,
including pregnant women" that disqualify "anyone who is physically unable to work or who is unavailable for work." 122 The implication is not that it is permissible to deny benefits to claimants on the
basis of pregnancy as long as all others subject to a medical disability
are treated the same. Rather, the standard suggests that all those
unavailable for or unable to work are to be treated alike. The
House's approval did not, therefore, extend to provisions which deny
benefits to pregnant women who are able to and available for work
or to· women who are actually seeking to return to work after giving
birth.
The legislative history makes several references to Turner-type
statutes. 123 It is, however, devoid of any statement indicating that
Congress intended merely to codify the Turner result. Thus, although the Turner case focused congressional attention on the broad
issue of denial of unemployment compensation for separation from
work due to pregnancy, Congress did not limit its inquiry to presumptive disability.124
118. S. REP. No. 1265 at 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6013,
supra note 42. See generally notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text (discussing general eligibility criteria).
119. S. REP. No. 1265 at 19, 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6013,
6015, supra note 42.
120. See 122 CONG. REC. 22517, 22518 (1976) (comments of Mr. Steiger). Mr. Steiger
emphasized that not all pregnant women would, under the proposed amendment, automatically receive benefits. Pregnant women should be adjudged in terms of availability for work
and ability to work, as are all other claimants. See also notes 21-24 supra and accompanying
text.
121.
REP. No. 1265 at 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6015,
supra note 42.
122. H.R. REP. No. 755, supra note 42, at 50. The report commented on the inequity of
statutes that "deny benefits without regard to the woman's ability to work, availability for
work, or efforts to find work."
123. See H.R. REP. No. 755, supra note 42, at 50; SUBCOMMITTEE ON UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., INFORMATION
TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 10210 12 (Comm. Print 1975).
124. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 48, at 13. .But cf. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note

s.
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Additional evidence that Congress did not seek merely to eliminate presumptive disability clauses is contained in the report of the
House committee that presented the bill in December of 1975. 125
The report referred to nineteen state provisions that denied benefits
because of pregnancy. 126 It did not limit examples of these provisions to Turner-type violations, but delineated two major classes of
pregnancy disqualifications: those that employed conclusive presumptions and those that disqualified women who left work because
of pregnancy. 127
While the House report did not list the nineteen states to which it
referred, there is some speculation 128 that the nineteen states intended were those mentioned in a Labor Department Unemployment Insurance Program Letter129 one week earlier. This bulletin
listed a variety of discriminatory state provisions relating in general
to family obligations and to pregnancy.
Although it is not certain why the Labor Department focused on
these nineteen states, at a minimum there seems to be no reason to
assume that Congress meant to alter the practices of only these
states. Other states that did not appear on the list had promulgated
supplementary regulations or had adopted policies that denied benefits to pregnant or formerly pregnant women on similar grounds. 130
The House report stated that although the provisions varied among
the nineteen states, all were inequitable because they denied benefits
despite the woman's availability and attempts to secure employ10, at 9-11 (Congress concerned with elimination of automatic pregnancy disqualification in
laws at that time).
12S. H.R. REP. No. 75S, supra note 42.
126. The relevant portion of the House Report explains: "At the present time, 19 States
have provisions which, in effect, deny benefits because of pregnancy. They vary from State to
State, but they are all inequitable in that they deny benefits without regard to the woman's
ability to work, availability for work, or efforts to find work." H.R. REP. No. 75S, supra note
42, at SO.
127. In a section comparing the proposed provisions with those then in effect, the House
report states: "Nineteen states have special disqualification provisions pertaining to pregnancy. Several of these provisions hold pregnant women unable to work and unavailable for
work; the remainder disqualify a claimant because she left work on account of her condition or
because her unemployment is a result of pregnancy." H.R. REP. No. 75S, supra note 42, at 7.
128. See Brief for Appellants, supra note S2, at 18.
129. "Su=ary of Discriminatory State Provisions Relating to Pregnancy, Domestic and
Marital Obligations and Dependent's Allowances,'' Unemployment Insurance Program Letter
No. 33-7S, [197S-1980 Unemployment Insurance Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH)
~ 1996 (197S) [hereinafter cited as Unemployment Insurance Program Letter]. The nineteen
jurisdictions cited as having discriminatory pregnancy provisions were Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and West
Virginia.
130. The prime example is South Carolina. The Porcher case involved a challenge to state
practice. No reference to pregnancy appeared on the face of the statute. S.C. CODE. ANN,
§ 41-3S-120(1) (Law. Co-op., 1977 and Supp. 1982).
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ment. 131 Presumably, a similar denial of benefits in any state would
be just as inequitable.
The nineteen state provisions listed in the Department of Labor's
Unemployment Insurance Letter were quite diverse in their treatment of pregnancy. Some states provided for prescribed periods of
ineligibility after return to work 132 or after giving notice of a desire
to resume work. 133 Others included presumptive periods of disability or unavailability. 134 A few states presumed inability or unavailability until proof to the contrary was tendered. 135 If Congress were
concerned only with presumptive disability, then only those statutes
that employed such presumptions would have been under consideration. The variety of provisions in the nineteen mentioned states suggests that Congress was seeking a broader remedy.
Thus, it appears likely that although Congress focused on presumptive disability, it elected to implement a broader remedy. Yet,
even if Congress had intended only to eliminate presumptive disability provisions, statutes that deny benefits to formerly pregnant women on the ground that they have voluntarily quit without good
cause related to employment would still contravene congressional intent. The basic defect inherent in presumptive disability periods, as
indicated by the Supreme Court in Turner and implied in the committee reports accompanying the 1976 amendments, is that presumptive disability clauses supplant individualized determinations of a
claimant's ability and availability. 136 Statutes that label a woman's
separation from work because of childbirth as a voluntary leaving
without good cause 137 merely substitute one presumption for an131. "Under eligibility provisions applicable to all claimants, including pregnant women,
anyone who is physically unable to work or who is unavailable for work is ineligible for benefits. These determinations are made on the basis of the facts of each individual case and make
discriminatory disqualifications because of pregnancy unnecessary." R.R. REP. No. 755, supra
note 42, at 50.
132. For example, in Colorado a claimant generally was ineligible after childbirth until she
had worked 13 weeks. If she was the sole support of a child or an invalid spouse, however, she
was ineligible for only 30 days. In Tennessee, a woman was disqualified for 21 days after she
was able to work. In West Virginia, the period of ineligibility ranged from 30 days after return
to work to 6 weeks before and after, depending on the circumstances of separation. Unemployment Insurance Program Letter, supra note 129.
133. Alabama disqualified women whose maternity leaves extended beyond ten weeks unless they gave three weeks notice of a desire to return to work. Id.
134. The District of Columbia, Kansas, Montana, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Utah and
Texas provided for varying periods of presumptive disability or unavailability. Id. All of
these statutes are presumably unconstitutional after the Supreme Court decision in Turner.
135. Delaware, Oregon, Maryland, Nevada and Ohio presumed disability until rebutted
by a statement from the woman's physician or by a ruling by the program's administrator. Id.
136. The Supreme Court in Turner held that the fourteenth amendment required the state
to use more individualized procedures. See note 92 supra (quoting Turner, 423 U.S. at 46).
Both the Senate and House reports accompanying what is now § 3304(a)(l2) stressed the importance of individualized determinations on the basis of the criteria normally employed in
evaluating a worker's claim. See notes 121 & 126 supra and accompanying text.
137. See note 11 supra.
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other. Under this type of statute, a pregnant or formerly pregnant
woman is denied benefits without regard to the circumstances surrounding her departure. Presumably, even if Congress did direct its
inquiry at presumptive disability, statutes that contain the very infirmities Congress sought to remedy in a slightly altered form cannot
be said to effe<;:tuate congressional intent.
III.
A.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Pregnancy Policy and the Potentialfor Gender .Discrimination

The theory that pregnancy should be afforded the same treatment as that afforded any physical disability or medical condition
originated in the 1970's in the context of employment discrimination
claims. 138 Although these claims met with varying degrees of success, 139 a g~neral definition of the nature of pregnancy claims began
to emerge.
The majority of these suits involved challenges to mandatory maternity leave policies 140 or to disqualification of pregnancy from employer-sponsored disability insurance plans. 141 In these cases,
employers routinely contended that pregnancy was not an illness, 142
but a temporary physical condition voluntarily assumed, 143 and
therefore reasonably subject to unique treatment. 144 Most courts re138. Some of these suits were brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1982). See, e.g., Berg v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 528 F.2d 1208
(9th Cir. 1975), vacatedper curiam, 434 U.S. 158 (1978) (mandatory maternity leave); Gilbert
v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), revd., 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (overruled by 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (enacted Oct. 31, 1978)) (pregnancy benefits); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1975) (pregnancy benefits and
maternity leave). Others were based on equal protection theories brought under the fourteenth
amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184
(6th Cir. 1972), qffd., 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave); Aiello v. Hansen, 359
F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973), revd. sub nom. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclusion of pregnancy from state disability plan); Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D.
ID. 1972), revd., 525 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1975) (mandatory maternity leave).
139. See generally Note, The 1978 Pregnancy JJiscrimination Act: A Problem ofInterpretation, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 607, 607-23 (1980) (description of state of law at time of enactment of
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)).
140. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Green v. Waterford
Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
141. See, e.g., Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), revd., 429 U.S.
125 (1976) (overruled by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (enacted Oct. 31, 1978)); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
142. See, e.g., Newman v. Delta Air Lines, 374 F. Supp. 238, 245 (N.D. Ga. 1973), qffd. per
curiam, 415 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1973).
143. See Gilbert v.'General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661,665 (4th Cir. 1975), revd., 429 U.S. 125
(1976) (overruled by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d
199, 206 (3d Cir. 1975), vacatfd, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
144. See Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7,519 F.2d 961, 963 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1037 (1977); Scott v. Opelika City School, 63 F.R.D. 144, 147 (M.D. Ala.
1974). See generally Note, Income Protection for Pregnant Workers, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 389,
391-94 (1976) (discussing legislation and case law affecting pregnant women).
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jected this argument on two grounds. First, the courts -recognized
that pregnancy is not necessarily voluntary, in the ordinary sense of
the word. 145 Second, although pregnancy is not an illness or a disease, it is a condition with similar attributes. 146 Both illness and
pregnancy can lead to inability to work, the incurrence of medical
expenses and a loss of income. 147
Congress has also, in some instances, equated pregnancy with
other medical conditions. Since 1972, the Equal Opportunity Commission guidelines have drawn an analogy between pregnancy and
illness. 148 More recently, Congress incorporated the correlation between sickness and pregnancy into the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978. 149 Yet, it is important to note·that, despite the fact that
pregnancy has been compared to illness, the analogy is not an exact
one.
Pregnancy and childbirth are different from illness in._the funda145. Many women cannot or will not use birth control for religious or medical reasons.
Further, no method of birth control is 100% effective. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511
F.2d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1976), See generally Note, Fourteenth
Amendment: Public School Maternity Leave: Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 35
Omo ST. L.J. 1004, 1022 & n.140 (1974) (describing documented side effects of currently available contraceptive drugs). But cf. Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 398
(4th Cir. 1973), revd. sub nom. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (pregnancy is usually voluntary).
146. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 206 (3d Ck 1975), vacated, 424
U.S. 737 (1976); see also Note, Love's Labor Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.R. 260, 282 (1972) (listing shared characteristics of childbirth and shortterm disabilities in general).
147. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 500-01 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (overruled by
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (enacted Oct. 31, 1978)); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d
199, 206 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
148. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1984). The original 1972 version of the regulations is printed in
37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6837 (1972). This section reads:
§ 1604.10 Employment policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth.
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima facie violation of title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth,
and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should
be treated as such under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan
available in connection with employment. Written and unwritten employment policies
and practices involving matters such as the commencement and duration of leave, the
availability of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave
plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on
the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other disabilities.
(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by an
employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termination
violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by
business necessity.
The guidelines in their current form contain the same language requiring employers to treat
pregnancy-related disabilities as any health disability. The current version, however, has been
amended to include a statement on health benefits covering abortion. Section 1604.IO(d)(l)
was added to mandate that fringe benefit programs comply with the regulations by April 1979.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.I0(d)(l) (1984).
149. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e(k) (1982).
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mental sense that our society recognizes distinct and important rights
associated with procreation and family matters. 1so Aside from the
fundamental personal liberties that are also involved, the state has
an acute interest in promoting survival of the species. 1s1
Furthermore, a distinguishing characteristic of pregnancy is that
it is exclusively a female condition. Several courts 1s2 and Congress1s3 have acknowledged that policies relating to pregnancy and
childbirth must be considered in light of the fact that they uniquely
affect women. This alone does not serve to distinguish pregnancy
from illness, since some illnesses are gender-linked. 154 Nonetheless,
it is important to recognize that policies affecting pregnant women
potentially could be used to discriminate on the basis of sex.
Even absent discriminatory intent, regulation of benefits on the
basis of pregnancy may have the effect of sex discrimination. 1ss The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has stated: "Essentially, the courts have found that discrimination does not occur
solely through the conscious, intentional actions against individual
victims, or observable, unequal treatment of different groups, but
most pervasively through the discriminatory impact on whole classes
of people of employment practices which may appear facially neutral."1s6 Consideration of the practical consequences .flowing from
enforcement of a statute is a relevant facet of statutory construction.1s7 Congress and the courts have endorsed a national policy to
150. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1972) (abortion); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (contraceptives); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (mandatory
sterilization).
151. See Zablocki v. Redbail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1977); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 96 (10th
Cir. 1973).
152. See, e.g., Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 95 (10th Cir. 1973)
(mandatory maternity leave "penalizes feminine schoolteacher for being a woman"); Farkas v.
Southwestern City School Dist, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9619 (S.D. Ohio), affd. mem., 506
F.2d 1400 (6th Cir. 1974) (failure to pay sick leave for pregnancy-related absences constitutes
sex discrimination). But cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) (validating
state policy of excepting pregnancy from disability insurance plan on ground that program did
not discriminate against any definable class).
153. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (defining "because of sex" or "on the basis of
sex" as including but not limited to "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions").
154. See Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 338, 340 (1977).
155. In the equal protection area, the Supreme Court has held that discriminatory impact
may be evidence of discriminatory intent even in the case of a statute that is neutral on its face,
See Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
156. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMN., ELIMINATING DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT: A COMPELLING NATIONAL PRIORITY 1-1 (1979) (emphasis in original); see
also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
157. See, e.g., Hasbrouck Heights Hosp. Assn. v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 15 N.J.
447, 453, 105 A.2d 521, 524 (1954).
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eliminate all forms of employment discrimination. 158 Interpretation
of section 3304(a)(l2) in a way which intentionally or effectively fosters sex discrimination in employment directly undercuts this important policy.
B.

Denial of Unemployment Compensation as an Economic Barrier

Historically, maternal benefit legislation was aimed at protecting
the health of women and newborns. 159 In recent years, attention has
shifted to include concern with protection of the economic contributions of women. 160 Studies have shown that not only are more women participating in the work force, 161 but that these women are
either making a significant contribution to family income 162 or are
the sole source of it. 163 Because a pregnant woman will almost invariably have to leave work for some time for childbirth, 164 the
availability of some type of income security is crucial. Women whose
employers grant maternity leave and who return to work on a speci158. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMN., supra note 156, at 1-1.
159. S. KAMERMAN, supra note 4, at 13; cf. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141
(1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (''The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs
to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother.").
160. S. KAMERMAN, supra note 4, at 13.
161. During the 1970's women represented 60% of the growth in the labor force. The participation rate of women in the labor force climbed from 43% in 1970 to 51% in 1980. CENSUS
BUREAU, MONEY INCOME, supra note 2, at 3.
162. See S. KAMERMAN, supra note 4, at 8. In a 1974 study, nearly two-thirds of all women
in the work force were reported to be unmarried or married to men who earned less than
$7,000 per year. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WHY WOMEN WORK (1974). Further, the median percentage of faniily income accounted for by a working wife's earnings is
highest when the family income is less than $3000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT.
OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-23, No. 100, A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES: 1978, at 79 (1980).
163. See S. KAMERMAN, supra note 4, at 8.
164. See LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1189 (6th Cir. 1972) (Phillips,
C.J., dissenting in part), qffd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In a policy statement adopted in 1974, the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists explained:
Pregnancy is a physiological process. All pregnant patients, however, have a variable
degree of disability on an individual basis, as indicated below, during which time they are
unable to perform their usual activities. (1) In an uncomplicated pregnancy, disability
occurs near the termination of pregnancy, during labor, delivery and the puerperium.
The process of labor and puerperium is disabling in itself. The usual duration of such
disability is approximately six to eight weeks. (2) Complications of a pregnancy may
occur which give rise to other disability. Examples of such complications include toxemia, infection, hemorrhage, ectopic pregnancy, and abortion. (3) A woman with preexisting disease which in itself is not disabling, may become disabled with the addition of
pregnancy. Certain patients with heart disease, diabetes, hypertensive cardiovascular disease, renal disease, and other systemic conditions may become disabled during their pregnancy because of the adverse effect pregnancy has upon these conditions.
The onset, termination and cause of the disability, related to pregnancy, can only be
determined by a physician.
Policy Statement of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (adopted Mar. 2,
1974), quoted in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 501 n.4 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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fied day have no problem. For women who are denied reinstatement
when they seek to return to work, however, the availability of unemployment compensation may be of great importance. This is especially true given that only a small minority of women are covered by
private health plans for the time period of actual disability caused by
pregnancy. 165
Some courts have criticized the denial of benefits because of
pregnancy, arguing that it forces a woman to choose between employment and childbirth through subtle economic pressures that demean her role in the economy 166 by frustrating her attempts to
reenter the job market. 167 The district court in Porcher speculated
that without .financial assistance, e.g., for expenses such as child care,
recent mothers might not be able to compete in the employment process with other applicants. 168 A woman who has withdrawn from
the labor force will likely experience a decline in job status and
hourly earnings upon her reentry.1 69 Further, when a woman leaves
the work force, both the employer's and the woman's incentives to
invest in her potential economic capacity are weakened.17° Thus,
discouraging a woman from maintaining attachment to the labor
force following pregnancy can cause long-term economic disadvantage in addition to a short-term decline in her family's standard of
' 171
livmg.
Unemployment compensation is designed to provide partial
wage replacement to the involuntarily unemployed worker so he or
she can look for a job.172 The requirements of section 3304(a)(l2) do
not mandate a departure from this purpose. The section does not
necessarily require payment of benefits to a pregnant woman who
165. See S. KAMERMAN, supra note 4, at 12.
166. See, e.g., Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 96 (1973) (school policy of
termination after six months of pregnancy invades a woman's privacy by forcing her to choose
between employment and pregnancy); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195, 201, 517 P.2d 599,
603 (1974) (rejecting argument that pregnant women are unattached to the labor market). Bui
if. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-86 (1970) (nondiscriminatory allocation of welfare benefits does not impermissibly burden family interests). Unemployment compensation,
however, is distinguished from general welfare. Welfare payments are to provide subsistence,
while unemployment compensation serves to replace lost earnings. See Super Tire Engg. Co.
v. Mccorkle, 550 F.2d 903, 908 (3d Cir. 1977).
167. See Conlin, Equal Protection Versus Equal Rights Amendment - Where Are We
Now?, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 259, 306 (1975).
168. 502 F. Supp. at 956.
169. See E. APPLEBAUM, BACK TO WORK: DETERMINANTS OF WOMEN'S SUCCESSFUL REENTRY 45-54 (1981).
170. Sandell, Lifetime Participation in the Labor Force and Unemployment Among Mature
Women, in WOMEN IN THE U.S. LABOR FORCE 142, 151 (A.F. Cahn ed. 1979),
171. See E. APPLEBAUM, supra note 169, at 28-29.
172. See California Dept. of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 132 (1971)
(citing Hearings on R.R. 4120 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 214 (1935) (statement of federal relief administrator and member of the Co=ittee on
Economic Security)).
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left work before truly disabled or who, for personal reasons, did not
return to work when able after childbirth. 173 Nor does this section
prevent the states from imposing a period of disqualification on
pregnant women who are unable to or unavailable for work. 174
What section 3304(a)(12) does prohibit is the denial of benefits to an
otherwise eligible individual solely because she left her last employment because of pregnancy or because she is currently pregnant.
In the absence of section 3304(a)(l2), perhaps a state could treat
pregnancy as any other medical condition for purposes of unemployment compensation, without endangering its claim to federal funds.
This would be consistent with the policy of allowing the states to
formulate their own guidelines in areas not covered by the Federal
Act. 175 Congress, however, enacted section 3304(a)(12) in 1976 as a
prohibition against denying benefits solely on the basis of pregnancy
or termination of pregnancy. The fact that pregnancy is in some
respects like an illness 176 does not necessarily imply that it must be
treated as such for all purposes.
In section 3304(a)(l2) Congress specifically addressed the issue of
denial of benefits based on pregnancy. Perhaps, ideally, Congress
should prohibit disqualification on the basis of separation due to any
bona fide medical condition. The process of legislating, however,
necessarily involves the drawing of lines. 177 The fact that Congress
chose to focus on only one aspect of the problem 178 does not alter the
binding nature of the remedy elected.
The original purpose of federal unemployment legislation was to
induce the states to provide benefits to certain workers when the
173. See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 10, at 23 (discussing likely impact of alternative
applications of the Porcher decision). The exact date upon which a pregnant woman should
leave work or return to work after childbirth is a medical decision that should be reached by
the woman and her doctor.
174. See note 23 supra and accompanying text; note 120 supra.
175. See note 111 supra. Bella Abzug, congresswoman from New York, taking the floor in
support of the 1975 Unemployment Compensation Amendments as presented in H.B. 10210,
co=ented:
I want to co=end the committee for including section 312 which prohibits States
from delaying or terminating benefits solely on the basis of pregnancy. This exclusion,
which has been challenged by court action in several States, has placed an additional
burden on women seeking to collect benefits.
The decision when to terminate one's employment because of pregnancy is an individual one to be decided by the woman and her doctor. So long as a woman is available for
work she is entitled to collect unemployment compensation.
122 CONG. REC. 22516 (1976).
176. See notes 138-54 supra and accompanying text.
177. See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 174 (1978) ("Social welfare legislation, by
its very nature, involves drawing lines among categories of people . . . ."); Massachusetts Bd.
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,314 (1976) (per curiam).
178. In the context of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress may act to eliminate an evil without simultaneously remedying every related evil. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 485
(1980); Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213, 220 (1978) (per curiam).
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states may not have done so on their own initiative. 179 Allowing the
states to deny compensation to otherwise eligible women returning
to the work force after or during pregnancy thus frustrates one of the
most basic goals of the program. Under the framework of FUTA,
the states are given a choice: to comply with the Act's fundamental
standards or to forgo federal assistance. 180 Policies that encourage
eligible women to pursue their job search best serve the broad remedial purposes of FUTA. 1s1

IV. CONCLUSION
In 1976, Congress addressed an issue of substantial concern to
working women: the availability of unemployment compensation to
persons whose unemployment results from pregnancy. By adding
section 3304(a)(l2) to the list of fundamental federal standards, Congress sought to enjoin the states from denying benefits to otherwise
eligible claimants solely because they left their last employment due
to a pregnancy-related disability. In enacting section 3304(a)(12),
Congress recognized that women who are otherwise attached to the
work force may become displaced by the period of disability that
necessarily accompanies childbirth. The intent of the legislature was
to bring these women within the coverage of the federal act precisely
because some states denied benefits to pregnant or formerly-pregnant women despite their ability to work and availability for
employment.
The intent expressed by Congress in enacting section 3304(a)(l2)
is consistent with the realities of the changing American labor force.
Increasing numbers of women join the labor force each year. The
majority of these women will become pregnant at some point in their
working lives. Denial of income security to these women demeans
their economic role in society by frustrating their attempts to reenter
the work force. Furthermore, because pregnancy uniquely affects
women, policies that deny benefits on the basis of pregnancy create
the potential for intentional or effective gender discrimination.
The interpretation of section 3304(a)(l2) advanced by several
states and endorsed by the Department of Labor directly contravenes the language of that statute and the policy behind it. Congress
enacted section 3304(a)(l2) as an express prohibition against denial
of unemployment compensation to claimants who would have received benefits but for the fact that they left their last employment
because of pregnancy. Congress intended to leave the decision of
when a pregnant woman should terminate her employment to the
179. See note 3S supra.
180. See New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 241 (1st
Cir.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980).
181. Porcher, S02 F. Supp. at 9S6.
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woman and her physician. To allow the states to label such a termination voluntary and thus deny benefits defeats the very purpose of
the section. Similarly, allowing the states to treat pregnancy like any
other medical condition ignores the fact that Congress specifically
addressed the issue of pregnancy-related disqualification in section
3304(a)(l2).

